This article was written before COP29 started taking place in Baku.
After three decades of independence, Azerbaijan started to position as a fierce fighter for decolonisation. It has to be mentioned that this is not a new politics for Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's Constitutional Act of Independence (1991) presents a very strong anti-colonial language. As the only former Soviet Republic, it openly states that "for 70 years against the Azerbaijan Republic the colonialism policy was pursued, natural resources of Azerbaijan were ruthlessly operated and its national wealth was taken away, the Azerbaijani people were exposed to prosecutions and repressions, its national advantage was trampled. Despite it, the Azerbaijani people continued the fight for the state independence."[1] Subsequently, in 2011, Azerbaijan became a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).[2] At the time, this decision sparked considerable skepticism, particularly among opposition groups, who perceived it as a deviation from the Euro-Atlantic integration process. In contrast, the government and its affiliated analysts framed Azerbaijan's accession to NAM as a strategy to assert greater autonomy from NATO.[3] While joining NAM a decade ago could be seen as an effort to balance competing geopolitical influences, recent developments indicate a shift towards a less balanced and more assertive foreign policy orientation.
This shift is reflected in Azerbaijan's recent rhetoric against (neo)colonialism which is mainly directed towards France. Once serving as a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group—established to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan—France has now emerged as a principal adversary for Azerbaijan.[4] This sudden change in stance has been observed since the Second Karabakh War, following Macron’s public declaration that France will not abandon Armenian people.[5]
Since that time, Aliyev has, on multiple occasions, publicly criticized France, a narrative that has been further amplified by state-controlled media, which has perpetuated and intensified this narrative.
Aliyev seizes every international platform to underscore France’s colonial history. One of the initial critiques emerged during his visit to the Arab League Summit in Algeria in 2022, where he highlighted the French atrocities committed against the Algerian population.[6]
In 2023, Azerbaijan presided over a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), during which the specific injustices of French colonialism and neocolonialism were once again highlighted. In a speech delivered during the 2020 war, Aliyev notably referred to NAM’s support for Azerbaijan during a United Nations Security Council session, where the group blocked a resolution unfavorable to Azerbaijan.[7] This rhetoric culminated last year with the establishment of the Baku Initiative Group, whose stated aim is “to foster international partnerships in the field of decolonization and human rights.”[8] Unsurprisingly, the initiative focuses exclusively on French overseas territories (New Caledonia, Corsica, Martinique, Guadalupe etc) which indeed were colonised and the indigenious population still struggles to gain independence. Furthermore, the Baku Initiative Group organized a conference titled “Neocolonialism: Human Rights Violations and Injustice,” where Aliyev addressed the participants, once again exclusively denouncing French colonialism. Azerbaijan’s Permanent Representative subsequently submitted the speech as an official letter to the UN Secretary-General, requesting its circulation as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.[9]
At the 6th World Forum on Intercultural Dialogue, another high-level UN event held in Baku in 2024, Aliyev reiterated his critique of France’s neocolonial practices in its overseas territories.[10]
Recently, France accused Azerbaijan of instigating unrest among the indigenous Kanak population in New Caledonia, an allegation that Baku denied, despite the presence of Azerbaijani flags during the demonstrations[11] and active support through Baku Initiative Group.
In line with its ongoing decolonial discourse, Baku is now preparing to host the COP29 Conference, a high-level UN event on climate action, and has pledged to incorporate the perspectives of indigenous peoples—those most affected by climate change—into the conference agenda. According to Reuters, Baku is even willing to fund the travel expenses of delegations from small island states to facilitate their participation.[12]
Where is the problem?
Decolonization, as a value-driven political framework, is susceptible to appropriation by actors motivated by strategic interests, such as Azerbaijan. Baku's purported shift towards decolonial rhetoric serves as a new façade, utilizing the language of decolonialism to obscure its underlying objectives, which extend beyond the mere pursuit of authoritarian aims.[13]
The decolonization struggles of the last century revolved around the myth that establishing independent nation-states would serve as a remedy for colonial exploitation. Only a few thinkers, such as Fanon, questioned the future trajectory of these emerging states, expressing skepticism about whether replacing colonial elites with local ones would effectively address issues of capitalist, racial, and gendered exploitation, while keeping the model of political organisation similar to the ones in the center of empire.[14] Now, three decades after the final wave of decolonization concluded with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many postcolonial states have not achieved the anticipated peace and stability. Instead, they have often devolved into authoritarian regimes characterized by further exploitation of their populations.
One explanation for this degradation is the enduring presence of colonial conditions. Centuries-old colonial structures cannot simply vanish overnight with the juridico-political withdrawal of empire.[15] While the formal processes of decolonization may have marked the end of colonialism, ‘coloniality’ persists. The concepts of the ‘coloniality of power’ or the ‘colonial power matrix,’ as articulated by Latin American scholars Grosfoguel and Quijano, capture how colonial legacies continue to permeate our everyday lives through multiple hierarchies, shaping universal ideas around economics, politics, race, gender, sexuality, class, and more. The Latin American decolonial school, therefore, extends the critique of colonialism beyond the confines of cultural discussions to address its broader structural and systemic dimensions.
First, they challenge the validity of the dichotomy between political economy and cultural relations, arguing that it misrepresents the complex nature of social interactions. The traditional notion of separating structure and superstructure in cultural matters fails to capture the intertwined reality of these relations. For instance, the concept of race is as integral to the formation of capitalist dynamics as capitalism is to the construction of racial hierarchies. Rather than being causally linked in a linear manner, they exist in a state of mutual entanglement. This distinction is crucial because the postcolonial school of thought has predominantly concentrated on the cultural dimensions of the colonial condition, often overlooking the political economy. Meanwhile, issues of political economy have typically been relegated to Marxist or socialist frameworks, thereby reinforcing another layer of coloniality. How so?
This brings us to the second key component of decolonial thought: epistemic coloniality. This concept refers to coloniality not only as a set of material conditions—such as territorial occupation or colonial governance—but also as a system that perpetuates colonial structures within knowledge production and other power relations. Drawing on Foucault’s notion of knowledge as an element of power,[16] Latin American scholars contend that Western-centric forms of knowledge—thinking from or with the center—are fundamentally part of the issue. Such an approach prevents us from critically deconstructing concepts deeply embedded in our everyday realities and understanding their roles within our specific communities. Consequently, even the critical frameworks of Marxism, socialism, anarchism, feminism, and post-structuralism etc. are products of Eurocentric modernity. To break free from this epistemic hold, it is essential to begin theorizing from the periphery, grounded in local contexts, rather than applying European theoretical frameworks as universal truths. Grosfoguel outlines the various ways in which coloniality influences and shapes our reality:
The Eurocentric notion of linear societal development at the nation-state level from pre-capitalist to capitalist is challenged, as all societies are integrated within a capitalist world-system that organizes labor based on racial classifications.[17]
The traditional Marxist concept of infrastructure and superstructure is replaced by a "heterarchy" of interrelated hierarchies, where subjectivity (i.e. race and racism) and the social imaginary are intrinsic to global capitalist accumulation, where coloniality is affecting all dimensions of social life (economic, sexual, or gender relations, to political organizations, structures of knowledge, state institutions, and households).[18]
The false dichotomy between culture and political economy in post-colonial and political economy studies is overcome, recognizing that culture and economy are intertwined within the capitalist world-system.[19]
Coloniality is not separate from modernity but forms an intrinsic part of it, with modern concepts like nation-states and democracy being shaped through colonial interactions and domination.[20]
Referring to the current world-system as merely "capitalist" is misleading; it is a complex structure of interwoven power relations, which includes capitalism but extends beyond it (“Capitalist/Patriarchal Western-centric/Christian-centric Modern/Colonial World-System” , encompassing a broader "colonial power matrix" and to change this world-system it is crucial to destroy the colonial power matrix.[21]
Transforming this world-system requires an anti-systemic decolonial approach, targeting multiple social hierarchies beyond just the economic dimension, challenging all forms of power including sexual, gender, racial, and epistemic.[22]
The global power hierarchies of the current world-system represent a civilization that enforces a colonial way of thinking and living, necessitating anti-systemic decolonial struggles for a new humanism and civilization.[23]
This proposition provides an insightful perspective, framing the contemporary global order as a direct consequence of Western colonialism. However, as previously noted, decolonial thinking necessitates an approach grounded in specific contexts. The conditions of coloniality for post-Soviet subjects present a somewhat distinct configuration. Positioned within the global capitalist system and at the periphery of Europe, Azerbaijan experienced colonial subjugation under both the Russian Empire and, later, the Soviet Union. This historical trajectory is deeply ingrained in Azerbaijan’s current political landscape and calls for a nuanced examination of the particular characteristics of Russian and Soviet colonialism.
Suny characterizes the Soviet Union as a "self-denying empire"—an empire that positioned itself as a staunch opponent of imperialism while simultaneously replicating similar imperial practices.[24] Despite its stated mission to dismantle empires globally and liberate oppressed peoples, the Soviet regime paradoxically engaged in a comparable civilizational project of nation-building. According to Suny, this nation-building initiative operated on multiple levels: the national, the sub-national (through the establishment of autonomous regions), and at the broader Soviet level, epitomized by the creation of the sovetskiy narod (the Soviet people).
Tlostanova conceptualizes this dynamic as an inherited legacy from the Russian Empire, which she describes as a "Janus-faced" entity—one that simultaneously self-orientalizes in relation to the West, seeking recognition it never fully attains, while simultaneously transmitting Western modernity.[25] This transmission occurred in two contradictory ways. On the one hand, Russia rejected Western modernity, positioning itself as morally superior by promoting narratives of saving the world from fascists, imperialists, and capitalists. On the other hand, despite this rejection, Russia reproduced modern coloniality by constructing its own “Orient” in the Caucasus and Central Asia. To assert its superiority over these regions, Russia engaged in a nation-building and civilizing mission, which closely paralleled the Western modernist project. The Soviet Union continued and expanded upon this unfinished project, effectively "modernizing" the Caucasus and Central Asia. According to Tlostanova, within the Soviet context, categories of race, gender, and sexuality were distinct from those found in capitalist empires, often intersecting with class and religious identities.[26] She describes this difference to manifest in a form of schizofrenic collective complex and many other psychological hang ups.
“The major discriminating ideological frames of western modernity, recycled and transmuted in the USSR, created a peculiar redoubling effect propagating a schizophrenic unsteadiness and uncertainty. The subaltern empire, even when claiming a global spiritual and transcendental superiority, has always been looking for approval/envy and love/hatred from the west, never questioning the main frame of western modernity, only changing the superfluous details. Such voids, silences, double entendres and contradictions were securely defended from criticism by the immense fear of repression and by the powerful brainwashing which followed the same logic as that of colonizing discourses and tactics. So one can speak of the specific rhetoric of the Soviet (or wider socialist) modernity in which the familiar logic of coloniality was still at work. The only difference was that the zero point from which the enunciation was made was not a western, Christian, middle-class male, but a Russian communist male proletarian. However, this imagined ideal, when embodied in real people, faced many difficulties, as the background he could use in building his superiority discourses was, once again, a foreign (and western) one, sparsely sprinkled with exoticized Russian features.”[27]
Despite their professed commitment to dismantling imperialism, the Soviets ultimately transformed into a distinct form of empire—an “affirmative action empire” centered on nation-building.[28] In doing so, they did not merely construct nations based on their own civilizational standards—an adapted version of Western civilizational norms—but also embedded these nations with similar insecurities and dependencies. Moreover, the Soviet regime established a robust bureaucratic state apparatus, which its successors continue to employ, using the same anti-imperial rhetoric to challenge their geopolitical adversaries on the international stage.
Azerbaijan searching for its place in the global hierarchy of the international relations
In this background, today, Azerbaijan finds itself in a post-colonial and post-Soviet condition. Being unable to decolonise, Azerbaijan seeks to find its place at the table of world system and have its piece of cake from it. Grosfoguel argues that "During the last 510 years of the “Capitalist/Patriarchal Western-centric/Christian-centric Modern/Colonial World-System” we went from the 16th Century “christianize or I shoot you,” to the 19th Century “civilize or I shoot you,” to 20th Century “develop or I shoot you,” to the late 20th Century “neoliberalize or I shoot you,” and to the early 21st century “democratize or I shoot you.”"[29]
This imbalance is also evident within the contemporary international legal framework. The liberal notion of equal states within the family of nations does not apply uniformly to post-colonial states. In the post-World War II order, this is particularly visible in the structure of the United Nations Security Council, where only the post-war victors hold permanent membership, possess veto power, and maintain the exclusive right to nuclear arms—privileges concentrated among the same great powers.[30] Such interpretation of international relations and law aligns with current geopolitical dynamics. Russia, for instance, seeks to assert its prerogative to invade and occupy other states, much like the United States and NATO can act with relative impunity. However, Russia continues to be marginalized and excluded from the Western sphere, revealing the persistent logic of its positioning as not-quite Western.
A similar dynamic can be observed in contemporary Azerbaijan. As a post-colonial state, rather than resisting this condition, Azerbaijan has inherited a form of schizophrenic identity. On one hand, this internal struggle for identity manifests in its participation in diverse organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Turkic Council, Council of Europe, CIS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, among others.[31] On the other hand, the lack of a cohesive national identity drives Azerbaijan’s aspiration to position itself as a bridge between global powers and evolve into a regional middle power.[32] Hosting various international events, such as Eurovision, Formula 1, and COP29, forms part of this strategy to gain recognition from the West as a “civilized” partner, maneuvering for a higher status within the global hierarchy.
COP29 serves as a compelling illustration of this political strategy. Despite facing significant environmental challenges, Azerbaijan’s economy remains heavily reliant on oil and fossil fuels. As a resource-rich state, revenues from oil and gas account for nearly half of the country’s GDP and approximately 90% of its total exports,[33] effectively positioning Azerbaijan as a classic rentier state.[34] As a rentier state, Azerbaijan depends on the rent rather than structuring economy around production and reducing dependance on foreign finance. The Azerbaijani elite—more specifically, Aliyev—exercise complete ownership and control over the flow of these resources. Following its independence from Russia, Azerbaijan quickly shifted to economic dependence on the West. The ruling elite signed the "Contract of the Century" with Western oil companies, establishing a Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) that holds more legal authority than the country's own constitution,[35] with the UK’s BP serving as the primary partner.
Currently, the European Union stands as Azerbaijan’s primary trading partner, accounting for nearly 50% of its trade volume.[36] While Azerbaijan publicly criticizes certain countries for engaging in neocolonial practices, its own elites have established highly favorable conditions for Western transnational corporations in the oil and gas sectors to engage in neo-extractivist activities. Neo-extractivism represents a modern form of resource extraction whereby transnational corporations exploit resources in developing countries ostensibly to promote development. [37] However, critical literature highlights that, despite increased state control over extractive activities, it is primarily the national elites who benefit, with minimal redistribution of revenues to the broader population. [38] Azerbaijan exemplifies this phenomenon, where the ruling elite—particularly Aliyev—continues to amass wealth from oil and gas revenues, while broader socio-economic benefits remain scarce.
In a recent speech in Berlin, Aliyev referred to fossil fuels as “gifts from God” and emphasized that Azerbaijan will continue to rely on them.[39] He explicitly stated, “as the leader of a country rich in fossil fuels, of course, we will defend the right of such countries to continue investments and production.”[40] It is evident that Azerbaijan is leveraging its participation in this conference to attract further investment in its oil and gas sector, utilizing the networks and connections facilitated by COP events. Although Azerbaijan has pledged a rapid transition to green and alternative energy, such promises are met with skepticism. Some economists argue that Azerbaijan attempted a similar transition following the 2014 collapse in oil prices but failed[41], as the economy remains heavily dependent on oil and gas nearly a decade later. Others suggest that any renewed effort to diversify the economy will face significant short-term limitations due to its entrenched reliance on resource rents, making the transition both challenging and potentially disruptive.[42]
Another example of Azerbaijan’s dependency on natural resources and the resulting environmental degradation is the operation of the British company Anglo-Asian Mining, which extensively exploits and contaminates the land in the Gedabay region. Last year, a local uprising against pollution caused by the company was violently suppressed by the Azerbaijani police.[43] The village was placed under siege, and participants were detained, with some receiving three-year prison sentences merely for printing protest posters. [44] While repressing its own population, which bears the brunt of neo-extractivist exploitation, Azerbaijan paradoxically claims to champion the rights of indigenous populations in island states—an ironic manifestation of its continued entanglement with colonial power dynamics.
These neo-extractivist policies have also reinforced the continued rule of Aliyev and the elite who thrive on the remnants of rentier revenues. As Fanon articulated, the post-colonial elites of newly independent states are remnants of the colonial order, disconnected from the struggles of their people and lacking genuine engagement with their concerns.
Today, these elites cynically deploy and manipulate decolonial rhetoric without any regard for, or connection to, the suffering of marginalized communities. Similar to Russia (or any other second-tier geopolitical actor with inferiority complex), Azerbaijan seeks validation from the West while simultaneously antagonizing it for its refusal to recognize Azerbaijan as an equal partner. Azerbaijan’s use of decolonial language is merely a strategic maneuver to assert its position within the international power hierarchy, selectively targeting adversaries based on current geopolitical frictions. Yesterday, the focus was France; today, it is the Netherlands;[45] and tomorrow, it will be another state. Azerbaijan’s haphazard use of hostile rhetoric against France disregards the potential repercussions for Kanak people, who may be subjected to increased violence from French authorities as a result.[46] Azerbaijani elites will never genuinely advocate for the oppressed communities such as the Chechens, Sakha, Tatars, and Kalmyks in Russia; Kurds in Turkey; Uyghurs in China; or, most significantly, the silenced national minorities within its own borders, such as the Talysh, Avars, Tats, and Lezgins, and the ethnically cleansed Armenians. Azerbaijan is not a value-based actor, but interest-based, appropriating value-based decolonial politics.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while Azerbaijan positions itself rhetorically as a champion of decolonialism—funding various initiatives and showcasing activism on the global stage by condemning the atrocities of French colonialism—it remains conspicuously silent on the colonial histories and neocolonial practices of Britain, Russia, Turkey, and other powers. As a post-colonial state still grappling with the neo-extractive influence of the UK, Azerbaijan exhibits a schizophrenic condition: on the one hand, it recognizes its own orientalization by the West and attempts to resist it; on the other, it seeks validation and acknowledgment as an equal power, at least within its regional context. Azerbaijan’s engagement with decolonial discourse serves merely as a strategy to secure its own share of global influence—a tactic reminiscent of Soviet-era maneuvers, now perpetuated by Russia. Additionally, despite its claims of resisting Western dominance, Azerbaijan continues to replicate Western discourses and practices in its nation- and state-building processes, ultimately failing to move beyond its colonial condition and to develop a truly autonomous framework of thought and governance.
Notes and references
[1] Azərbaycan Respublikasının dövlət müstəqilliyi haqqında Konstitusiya Aktı. 1991, preambula [The Constitutional Act On The State Independence Of The Republic Of Azerbaijan, preamble] <https://e-qanun.az/framework/6693, accessed on Sep 25, 2024; See unofficial translation: <https://azerbaijan.az/portal/History/HistDocs/Documents/en/09.pdf> accessed on Sep 25, 2024
[2] Azerbaijan joins Non-Aligned Movement. 2011. <https://namazerbaijan.org/azerbaijan-in-the-nam>, accessed on Sep 25, 2024
[3] Shahin Abbasov, “Azerbaijan: Facing a Choice Between NATO and NAM? 2011
<https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-facing-a-choice-between-nato-and-nam> accessed on Sep 25, 2024
[4] OSCE Minsk Group <https://www.osce.org/mg> accessed on Sep 25, 2024
[6] Ilham Aliyev attending 31st Arab League Summit held in Algiers. 2022. <https://president.az/en/articles/view/57754> accessed on Sep 25, 2024
[7] Ilham Aliyev addressed the nation. 2020. Aliyev: “The member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement stood up like real gentlemen and did not allow this [refers to the adoption of a resolution] to happen. They supported us – I say thank you to them. And this happened despite the fact that they came under pressure and may have even been threatened. But they stood up like gentlemen for us just as we stand up for them. It shows that nothing will work.”
<https://president.az/en/articles/view/44435> accessed on Sep 25, 2024
[9] Letter dated 24 October 2023 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/319/95/pdf/n2331995.pdf?OpenElement> accessed on Sep 25, 2024
[10] Ilham Aliyev attended opening of the 6th World Forum on Intercultural Dialogue in Baku. 2024 <https://president.az/en/articles/view/65691> accessed on Sep 25, 2024
[11] Amos Chapple, “Why Azerbaijan's Flag Is Flying Amid New Caledonia Unrest”. 2024 <https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-new-caledonia-photos-flags-unrest/32957740.html> accessed on Sep 25, 2024
[12] Kate Abnett, “Exclusive: Azerbaijan offers to fund climate-vulnerable islands' delegates at COP29, source says”. 2024 <https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/azerbaijan-offers-fund-climate-vulnerable-islands-delegates-cop29-source-says-2024-09-25/> accessed on Sep 25, 2024
[13] Bahruz Samadov, “Opinion | How Azerbaijan uses ‘anti-colonialism’ to authoritarian ends”. 2023. <https://oc-media.org/opinions/opinion-how-azerbaijan-uses-anti-colonialism-to-authoritarian-ends/ > accessed Sep 25, 2024. To the time this article is written, the author of the cited article, Bahruz Samadov, the young scholar and anti-war activist is arrested by the Azerbaijani government under the bogus treason charges for his activism. See here: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur55/8554/2024/en/
[14] Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Grove Press 2002).
[15] Ramón Grosfoguel, “The Epistemic Decolonial Turn: Beyond Political-Economy Paradigms” (2007) 21 Cultural Studies 211 <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09502380601162514> accessed Nov 5, 2022.
[16] Michel Foucault and Colin Gordon, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (1st American ed, Pantheon Books 1980).
[17] Ramón Grosfoguel, “Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality” (2011) 1 Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/21k6t3fq> accessed Sep 28, 2024.
[18] ibid (n 17)
[19] ibid (n 17)
[20] ibid (n 17)
[21] ibid (n 17)
[22] ibid (n 17)
[23] ibid (n 17)
[24] Ronald Grigor Suny, "An Empire to End Imperialism." Socialist History 52 (2017) 95-102
[25] Madina Tlostanova, "The Janus-faced empire distorting orientalist discourses: Gender, race and religion in the Russian/(post) Soviet constructions of the ‘Orient’." Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise 2.2 (2008) 1-11.
[26] Madina Tlostanova, “Postsocialist ≠ Postcolonial? On Post-Soviet Imaginary and Global Coloniality” (2012) 48 Journal of Postcolonial Writing 130 <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17449855.2012.658244> accessed Sep 28, 2024.
[27] ibid (n 26)
[28] Martin Terry, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923 - 1939 (1. print, Cornell University Press 2001).
[29] ibid (n 17)
[30] Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2004) <https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/9780511494185/type/book> accessed Sep 28, 2024.
[31]Laurence Broers, “Multipolarity meets a Fractured Region: New (Old) Challenges for an Armenian-Azerbaijani Peace”. 2024. Caucasus Edition. <https://caucasusedition.net/multipolarity-meets-a-fractured-region-new-old-challenges-for-an-armenian-azerbaijani-peace/> accessed on Sep 28, 2024
[32] Esmira Jafarova, Is Azerbaijan a “middle power”? 2020. <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/05/16/is-azerbaijan-a-middle-power/> cited in Laurence Broers, “Multipolarity meets a Fractured Region: New (Old) Challenges for an Armenian-Azerbaijani Peace”. 2024. Caucasus Edition. <https://caucasusedition.net/multipolarity-meets-a-fractured-region-new-old-challenges-for-an-armenian-azerbaijani-peace/> accessed on Sep 28, 2024
[33]Azerbaijan - Country Commercial Guide. 2023 <https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/azerbaijan-market-overview> accessed Sep 28, 2024
[34] Anja Franke, Andrea Gawrich and Gurban Alakbarov, “Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States: Resource Incomes and Autocracy as a Double ‘Curse’in Post-Soviet Regimes” (2009) 61 Europe-Asia Studies 109 <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09668130802532977> accessed Sep 29, 2024.
[35] Galib Bashirov, “New Extractivism and Failed Development in Azerbaijan” (2021) 42 Third World Quarterly 1829 <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2021.1926968> accessed Sep 29, 2024.
[36] Azerbaijan. EU trade relations with Azerbaijan. Facts, figures and latest developments.
<https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/azerbaijan_en> accessed on Sep 28, 2024
[37] ibid (n 35)
[38] ibid (n 35)
[39]Gabriel Gavin, Karl Mathiesen, “Azerbaijan president: COP29 won’t stop us investing in ‘god-given’ gas” 2024. Politico. <https://www.politico.eu/article/azerbaijan-president-ilham-aliyev-cop29-climate-change-gas/> accessed on Sep 25, 2024
[40] ibid (n 39)
[41] ibid (n 35)
[42] Ingilab Ahmadov, “Oil as a Perpetuum Mobile of Azerbaijan” 2023. Baku Research Institute <https://bakuresearchinstitute.org/en/oil-as-a-perpetuum-mobile-of-azerbaijan/> accessed on Sep 28, 2024
[43] Soyudlu Mine Protests. OC Media <https://oc-media.org/tag/soyudlu-mine-protests/> accessed on Sep 28, 2024
[44] Aytan Farhadova, “Soyudlu protest poster printer imprisoned on drug charges”. 2024. OC Media <https://oc-media.org/soyudlu-protest-poster-printer-imprisoned-on-drug-charges/> accessed on Sep 25, 2024
[45] Akbar Novruz, “Azerbaijan’s firm stand against neo-colonialism: BIG blasts Netherlands’ agenda” 2024. Azernews. <https://www.azernews.az/analysis/231343.html> accessed on Sep 28, 2024
[46] New Caledonia police kill two in operation linked to deadly unrest, prosecutor says. 2024. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/sep/20/new-caledonia-unrest-protests-police-kill-two-noumea> accessed on Sep 28, 2024
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